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Abstract 
 
While the provision of subsidized loans through the VBSP forms a cornerstone of Vietnam’s anti-
poverty policy, little is known on the impact of these preferential loans. In this paper, we use fixed-
effect regression to estimate the average effect of the program on income and expenditures of 
participating households, and subsequently assess the impact of the program on poverty and 
inequality. Our estimates indicate that the VBSP was quite effective. Participation on average seemed 
to have increased household income and expenditures by about thirty percent of the value of the loan,  
and an increase in loan size would have a similar effect. Despite that only one third of loans reaches 
households who are actually poor, our computations indicate that  the program decreased the head 
count of poverty for its participants by almost four percentage points. Similarly, the program 
decreased the poverty gap index and the poverty-severity index by almost twenty percent. The impact 
on Vietnam’s inequality was significant but small, which is not surprising because of the yet limited 
outreach of seven percent of the rural population. 
 
Keyword: Micro-credit, poverty, inequality, impact evaluation, fixed-effect model.  
JEL classification: I32; I38; H43; H81 
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1. Introduction  
  
There is wide consensus that micro-credit is an important tool for smoothing consumption and 
promoting production, thereby improving household welfare. A large number of empirical studies 
support this argument (e.g., Khandker, 1998, 2003; Khandker and Faruqee, 2003; Parker and 
Nagarajan, 2001; Robinson, 2001; Zaman, 2001; and a large number of studies presented in the review 
paper of Morduch and Haley, 2002). However, programs that provide credit for households are not 
always effective in improving welfare and reducing poverty. For example, Diagne and Zeller (2001) 
did not find a statistically significant impact of micro-credit programs on household income in 
Malawi. Similarly, Coleman (1999) found only negligible effects on household welfare of a micro-
credit program in Thailand, and Morduch (1998) showed that most of potential effects of micro-credit 
from the Grameen bank in Bangladesh were on vulnerability reduction instead of poverty reduction.  
Vietnam has set poverty reduction as a major goal of development policy. The poverty rate 
decreased remarkably from 28.9 percent to 19.5 percent during the period 2002-2004 (VHLSS data). 
However the poverty rate remains rather high in rural areas, at 25 percent in 2004. The government 
has maintained an extensive public safety net system to support the poor in all dimensionalities of 
welfare. One of the most important antipoverty programs is the provision of credit for the poor. In 
2003, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) was established to provide the poor with 
preferential micro-credit. The poor can borrow from the bank at low interest rates without collateral.  
The government has spent a huge amounts of finance in the VBSP program. The total 
outstanding loan for poor households was VND 13,428 trillion in 2005 (Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policies, 2005).1 Little is, however, known on the quantitative impact of the program. Most evaluation 
reports simply describe the implementation and outputs of the program, and questions on the causal 
impact of the program remain unanswered so far. Such information would be extremely helpful in 
determining whether the program should be expanded or terminated.  
Thus, the main objective of this paper is to examine to which extent the VBSP program has 
had an impact on household welfare and whether it has played a significant role in reducing poverty 
and inequality. To measure program impacts, the paper relies on fixed-effect regression using data 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2002 and 2004. These regressions not only provide 
information on the average effect of the program on income and expenditures of participating 
households, but we also use their results to compute the impact of the program on poverty and 
inequality. 
 
2. Data Sources 
 
The study relies on data from the two VHLSSs, which were conducted by the General Statistics Office 
of Vietnam (GSO) with technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years 2002 and 2004. The 
2002 and 2004 VHLSSs covered 30000 and 9000 households, respectively. The samples are 
representative for the national, rural and urban, and regional levels. The 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs set 
up a panel of 4000 households, which are representative for the whole country, and for the urban and 
rural population.  
                                                   
1
 1 USD  15000 thousands VND in January 2005.  
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 For the present study, we will use only data on the rural population only. Poverty in Vietnam is 
mostly a rural phenomenon, with 95 percent of all poor living in rural areas in 2004, and the VBSP 
targets its activities mainly to rural areas. The number of households in the rural panel for 2002-2004 
is 2776.  
The surveys collected information through household and community level questionnaires. 
Information on households includes basic demography, employment and labor force participation, 
education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed assets and durable goods, participation of 
households in poverty alleviation programs, and especially information on loans that households had 
obtained or still owned during the 12 months before the interview. Unfortunately, the latter 
information was only available for the 2004 survey. 
Data on expenditure and income were collected using very detailed questionnaires. Information 
on small and detailed expenditure and income categories was collected and then aggregated into 
expenditure and income per capita. Food expenditure includes purchased food and foodstuff and self-
produced products of households. Non-food expenditure comprises expenditure on education, 
healthcare expenditure, expenditure on houses and commodities, and expenditure on power, water 
supply and garbage. Household income can come from any source. Total income includes income 
from agricultural and non-agricultural production, salary, wage, pension, scholarship, income from 
loan interest and house rental, remittance and subsidies. Income from agricultural production 
comprises crop income, livestock income, aquaculture income, and income from other agriculture-
related activities.   
Information on commune characteristics was collected from 2960 and 2181 communes in the 
2002 and 2004 surveys, respectively. Data on commune characteristics consists of demography and 
general situation of communes, general economic conditions and aid programs, non-farm employment, 
agriculture production, local infrastructure and transportation, education, health, and social affairs. 
Commune data can be linked with household data to assess relationship between characteristics of 
households and characteristics of communes in which the households are located. In 2004, commune 
data were collected in rural areas only.  
 
3. The VBSP Program 
The VBSP was established in 2003 as an independent public institute for the provision of government 
lending to the poor and other vulnerable groups. The creation of the VBSP meant a consolidation of 
government-lending for the poor, and since 2003 outreach and has increased continuously (VBSP, 
2005). 
The VBSP program is designed as a group-based lending scheme. The argument for the group-
based design is that monitoring between credit members would lead to high repayment rates (e.g., 
Coleman, 1999). This strategy seems to have been successful, as default rates are less than 2 percent 
(VBSP, 2005). A credit group includes from 5 to 50 members who are located in the same village. 
There are several criteria that a household should meet to become a member of a credit group: (i) The 
household has a long-term residence permit at the locality in which the credit-borrowing group is 
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located; (ii) The household has someone who is able to work; (ii) The household is classified as the 
poor by local authority;2 (iv) The household has demand for credit.3 
To apply for credit, a household first sends a formatted letter to their credit group. The credit 
group will arrange a meeting of all members to consider the relevance of the borrowing. They will 
determine which household can borrow, and credit amount for corresponding households. The list of 
credit-borrowing households will be prepared by the credit group and sent to the People Committee in 
that commune. Once the list is justified by the People Committee, it will be sent to a VBSP branch for 
loan provision. Basically, the VBSP agrees with the list sent by the People Committee. Households 
can receive loans at a VBSP branch in their locality or the VBSP staffs bring the loans for households.    
To examine whether the program reached well-defined poor households, we classified 
households as poor if their per capita expenditure is below the poverty line set up by WB and GSO. 
The poverty line is equivalent to the expenditure level that allow for nutritional needs and some 
essential non-food consumption such as clothing and housing.4 This classification is more clear and 
consistent than the classification of commune authorities. We then compared credit use from the 
VBSP between poor and non-poor households using the data from VHLSS 2004. 
The coverage rate of the program was low: only twelve percent of poor households in rural 
areas borrowed from the VBSP. The average loan size for these households was VND 3175 thousands, 
which is about 1.5 times the per capita poverty line. Average monthly interest rates were 0.30 percent, 
which amounts to only 3.66 percent on a yearly basis. This is much lower than commercial rates. 
Commercial banks, e.g., use a yearly rate of twelve percent for loans of 6-12 months with collateral. 
The favorable interest rates could make VBSP loans attractive for poor and non-poor alike and thus 
result in high leakage rates if local authorities do not effectively exclude the non-poor. 
Indeed, leakage rates are very high. The coverage rate for the rural non-poor was seven percent 
and among the borrowing households, poor households accounted for only 33 percent. Moreover, non-
poor households on average borrowed VND 3715 thousands, which is higher than the average loan 
obtained by poor households. Consequently, only thirty percent of outstanding credit was allocated to 
poor households, the official target group of the program. According to Dufhues, et al. (2002), credit 
groups and commune heads are reluctant to include poor households in the list of credit applicants, as 
non-poor are expected to be more reliable in using credit effectively and repaying loans.    
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1. Impact evaluation indicators  
We use two indicators to measure the impact of the VBSP program. The first is the expected impact of 
program participation on the actual participants, which also known as the Average Treatment Effect 
                                                   
2
 The procedure to classify a household as poor by local authority is rather complicated. Basically, it depends on 
the income poverty line - which is set up by Ministry of Labor, Invalid, and Social Affairs - and other specific 
criteria set up by each commune.  
3
 The credit needs to be used in production, or consumption necessary for life. Specifically, the credit can be 
used in the following activities: Production, business, and service, which can generate income in the future; 
repair house under serious damage; educational cost for primary and secondary school pupil. 
4
 Regional price differences and monthly price changes over the survey period have been taken into account 
when the poverty lines are calculated.  
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on the Treated (ATT). Since loan size can vary, looking at participation alone does not tell the whole 
story of program impact. Our second indicator therefore refers to the expected effect of a small 
increase in loan size for participants. This is called the Average Partial Affect on the Treated (APET). 
To define ATT, denote bD  as a binary variable of participation in the program of a person, i.e., 
bD  equals 1 if she/he participates in the program and 0 otherwise. Further let Y denote the observed 
value of the outcome of interest. This variable can receive two potential values corresponding to the 
values of the participation variable, i.e., 1YY =  if 1=
bD , and 0YY =  otherwise. ATT can now be 
formalized as: 
)1()1( 01)1,0( =−== bb DYEDYEATT .        (1) 
Next, denote cD as a continuous program variable corresponding to loan size and )( cDY as the 
potential outcome corresponding to the value of variable cD . The change in program impact due a 
change in the amount of credit from d  to δ+d  is then: 
 
[ ] [ ]0)()(0),( >=−+==>∆ cccc DdDYdDYEDdE δδ .     (2) 
Dividing the right-hand side of (2) by δ , we obtain the second impact indicator used in this study; the 
Average Partial Affect on the Treated (APET): 
[ ]
δ
δ
δ
0)()(
),(
>=−+=
=
ccc
d
DdDYdDYE
APET .      (3) 
If we consider [ ]0)( >cc DDYE  as a real function of cD , and denote this function by 
)( c
oD Df c > , the APET is simply the derivative of )( coD Df c >  with respect to cD . 
 
4.2. Program impact on poverty and inequality 
As the ultimate aim of the VBSP program is to reduce the poverty and inequality, we considered 
not only the traditional impact indicators described above, but also looked directly at the effect of the 
program on a set of poverty and inequality indicators. We measured poverty by three Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke poverty indexes. To measure the inequality, we used three common measures of inequality: 
the Gini coefficient, Theil’s L index of inequality, and Theil’s T index of inequality. For all measures, 
we used per capita expenditures as welfare indicator. 
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes can all be calculated using the following formula 
(Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984): 

=



 −
=
q
i
i
z
Yz
n
P
1
1 α
α ,                                                                                                            (4)  
where z is the poverty line, n is the number of people in the sample population, q is the number of poor 
people, and Yi is per capita expenditures for person i. α can be interpreted as a measure of inequality 
aversion. When α = 0, we have the headcount index H which measures the proportion of people below 
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the poverty line. When α = 1 and α = 2, we have the poverty gap PG, which measures the depth of 
poverty, and the squared poverty gap P2, which measures the severity of poverty, respectively. 
The Gini coefficient can be calculated from the individual expenditures in the population as 
follows:  

= =
−
−
=
n
i
n
j
ji YY
nn
G
1 1)1(2
1
µ
 .                     (5) 
The value of the Gini coefficient varies from 0 when everyone has the same expenditures to 1 when 
one person has everything. Hence, the closer a Gini coefficient is to one, the more unequal is the 
distribution.  
The Theil L index of inequality is calculated as follows: 

=

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where Y  is the average per capita expenditure. The Theil L index ranges from 0 to infinity, and the 
higher is the value of Theil L, the higher is inequality. 
The Theil T index of inequality is calculated as: 
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The Theil T index ranges from 0 (lowest inequality) to ln(N) (highest inequality).  
The impact of the program on poverty index for participants is expressed as follows: 
),1(),1( 01 YDPYDPP =−==∆ ,          (8) 
where the first term in the right-hand side of (8) is the measure of poverty in the presence of the VBSP 
program. This term is observed and can be estimated directly from the sample data. However, the 
second term in the right-hand side of (8) is the counterfactual measure of poverty, i.e., poverty indexes 
of the credit recipients had they not received the credit. This term is not observed directly, and it is 
estimated.  
 Regarding inequality, we measure the impact of the program on reduction of inequality of the 
whole population. If the program increases expenditure for the poor more than for the rich, it will 
decrease inequality. The impact on an inequality index is expressed: 
)()( 0YIYII −=∆ ,            (9) 
where I(Y) is the observed inequality based on the observed outcome, and I(Y0) is the estimated 
inequality in the absence of a program.  
 
4.3. Estimation strategy 
To measure program impact and estimate the above-mentioned indicators, we assume welfare can be 
specified as follows: 
iititititit XDDXY εθγβα ++++=)ln( ,       (11)  
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where X is a vector of household and regional characteristics for household i at time t. The main 
problem in estimating the equation is the endogeneity of program participation. Borrowing can be 
correlated with unobserved characteristics of households, such as motivation for higher income or 
abilities in business. Failure to control for such factors leads to biased estimates of program impact.  
In this study, we use the panel nature of the data to avoid endogeneity bias. A main assumption 
of the method used is that unobserved variables that are correlated with both outcome and program 
variables remained unchanged during the period 2002-2004, which is covered by the panel. We feel 
that it is reasonable to assume that the relevant variables, such as business and production skills or 
motivation for higher income, were time-invariant during such a short period of time.  
To show how the panel nature of the data helps solving the endogeneity problem, suppose the 
error term can be split into two components: iu , which is correlated with D but stable over time, 
and iAv , which is uncorrelated with D but is allowed change. Equation (11) then becomes 
itiititititit vuXDDXY +++++= θγβα)ln( ,      (13a)  
or alternatively 
itititititiit vXDDXY ++++= θγβα)ln( ,       (13b)  
Which can be estimated without bias using fixed effect techniques. 
In this study, we used both income and expenditure per capita as outcome variables, and both a 
participation dummy and loan size as program variables. Please note that VBSP was initiated only in 
2003, so that program dummy and loan size are necessarily zero for all households in 2002. Other 
explanatory variables cover household characteristics, such as demography, household assets, housing, 
education, employment and health statues, and commune and village characteristics, such as 
infrastructure and socioeconomic attributes.  
For each equation, we used three models with different interactions between the program 
variable and explanatory variables to examine the sensitivity of impact estimates to interaction terms. 
In Model 1, there is no interaction between the program and explanatory variables. In Model 2, we 
introduced interactions between the program variables and human and agricultural wealth variables. In 
Model 3, interaction terms that are not statistically significant at the 10% level in Model 2 were 
dropped. The regression results are presented in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. 
Based on the regression results, we computed ATT and APET. We considered three estimates 
for both indicators: The average for all participants and separate estimates for poorb and non-poor 
households.  
The estimator of ATT can be expressed as follows: 
[ ]
=
++++
−==−==
p
iAiAiiiA
n
i
XXDDX
p
b
A
b
A ee
n
DYEDYETTA
1
ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
01
1)1|(ˆ)1|(ˆˆ βαθγβα ,  (15) 
where np is the number of participants in the program. APET equals: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]θγθγθγβα iAiAiAvuXDDXc XYEXeEDYEAPET iAiiAiiiA +=+=	
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 .  (16) 
Thus the estimator is given by: 
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ˆ θγ ,         (17) 
which depends on the level of participation. The standard error of the estimates can be calculated 
using the Delta method or bootstrap technique.   
 
5. Program impact 
 
5.1. Program impact on household income and expenditure 
Table 1 presents estimation results for ATT and APET. All estimates are statistically significant and 
positive, which indicates that the VBSP resulted in a significant increase in both expenditure and 
income for poor as well as non-poor participants. The point estimates as well as standard errors are 
rather similar for the three models, indicating that the estimates are not very sensitive to inclusion of 
interaction terms between program participation and household characteristics.  
 
Table 1 Estimates if ATT and APET for the VBSP (thousand VND) 
Outcome variable 
Expenditure per capita Income per capita  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
162.3*** 186.3*** 164.0**  248.9** 234.6**  193.8** 
  ATT [53.2] [54.9] [69.9] [110.1] [121.3] [108.7] 
0.0417*** 0.0504***  0.0464***  0.0526**  0.0960**  0.0904*** 
APETa  [0.0149] [0.0186] [0.0171] [0.0293] [0.0390] [0.0346] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 200 replications. 
a
 Values are computed at actual loan sizes. Results are almost identical when we use average loan size. 
 
The estimates indicate that the VBSP was quite effective in increasing income and expenditures. 
Using the point estimates, participation on average increased per capita income by 194-249 thousand 
VND and per capita expenditures by 162-186 thousand VND. At an average household size of five, 
this amounts to 970-1245 thousand VND and 810-930 thousand VND, respectively, at an average loan 
size of 3537 thousand VND. That is, the average increase in income at the household level amounts to 
27-35 percent of the average value of the loan and the average increase in expenditures to 23-26 
percent. The estimates for APET confirm these relatively high numbers. Again considering the point 
estimates and an average household of five persons, an increase of the loan by 1 VND would result in 
an increase in income of 0.25-0.48 VND and in expenditures of 0.20 to 0.25 VND. As repayment rates 
were extremely high, these numbers seem to indicate that households on average used the loans very 
well and obtained yearly returns of more than thirty percent. 
 
5.2 Program impacts on poverty and inequality  
Table 2 presents the estimates of the VBSP impact on poverty of the participants and inequality of the 
population. It shows that the results from the three models are similar, and that most of the estimates 
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are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or lower. Only model 2 produces some insignificant 
estimates, probably due to the limited number of degrees of freedom in this model. We will therefore 
focus our discussion on the results for the other two models. 
The VBSP clearly decreased poverty. The observed headcount of poverty for program 
participants was 39 percent. Without the program, this would have been almost four percentage points 
higher. Similarly, the program decreased the poverty-gap index by 0.02, which is a reduction of almost 
twenty percent. The program-induced percentage-reduction in the poverty-severity index was about 
the same.  
The program also decreased inequality, but these effects are extremely small. With the VSBP, 
Gini, Theil T and Theil L are all significantly lower than without the program, but the decrease is less 
than one percent of the without program value. It is not surprising that these numbers are low, as they 
refer to the entire rural population, and the program covered only seven percent of rural households.  
 
Table 2 Impact of the VBSP on poverty and inequality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
With VSBP Without VSBP VSBP effect 
Without 
VSBP VSBP effect 
Without 
VSBP VSBP effect 
Poverty        
P0   0.3865***  0.4265*** -0.0399**  0.4079*** -0.0214  0.4231*** -0.0366* 
 [0.0335] [0.0333] [0.0208] [0.0395] [0.0182] [0.0352] [0.0242] 
P1   0.0919***  0.1101*** -0.0182***  0.1041*** -0.0122  0.1093*** -0.0174** 
 [0.0104] [0.0112] [0.0060] [0.0114] [0.0085] [0.0115] [0.0072] 
P2   0.0328***  0.0406*** -0.0078***  0.0372*** -0.0044*  0.0393*** -0.0065** 
 [0.0051] [0.0056] [0.0026] [0.0053] [0.0025] [0.0054] [0.0033] 
Inequality        
Gini   0.2881***  0.2894*** -0.0012***  0.2890*** -0.0009*  0.2893*** -0.0012** 
 [0.0052] [0.0052] [0.0004] [0.0044] [0.0006] [0.0047] [0.0006] 
Theil L   0.1365***  0.1376*** -0.0012***  0.1371*** -0.0007*  0.1375*** -0.0010* 
 [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0004] [0.0043] [0.0004] [0.0045] [0.0006] 
Theil T   0.1427***  0.1439*** -0.0012***  0.1436*** -0.0009*  0.1439*** -0.0012** 
 [0.0064] [0.0065] [0.0004] [0.0053] [0.0005] [0.0061] [0.0005] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 200 
replications. 
Indexes with VSBP are calculated using observed expenditures. Indexes without VSBP are estimates of 
counterfactual poverty and inequality.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The provision of subsidized loans without formal collateral requirement through the VBSP forms a 
cornerstone of Vietnam’s anti-poverty policy. Yet, little is known on the impact of these preferential 
loans, as  most evaluation reports simply describe the implementation and outputs of the program. In 
this paper, we take a completely different approach and use fixed-effect regression to estimate the 
average effect of the program on income and expenditures of participating households, and 
subsequently assess the impact of the program on poverty and inequality. 
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Our estimates indicate that the VBSP was a quite effective program. Participation on average 
seemed to have increased household income and expenditures by about thirty percent of the value of 
the loan,  and an increase in loan size would have a similar effect. Despite that only one third of loans 
reaches households who are actually poor, our computations indicate that  the program decreased the 
head count of poverty for its participants by almost four percentage points. Similarly, the program 
decreased the poverty gap index and the poverty-severity index by almost twenty percent. The impact 
on Vietnam’s inequality was significant but small, which is not surprising because of the yet limited 
outreach of seven percent of the rural population. 
We consider these results as a lower benchmark of the impact of the VBSP for two reasons. 
First, we only measure the short-term impacts of the program. A finance-program should lead to 
capital accumulation and financial deepening, but these effects will take at lerast ten years to 
materialize. Second, the VBSP was not a completely new program but was preceded by the Vietnam 
Bank for the Poor (VBP). This program was supposedly much smaller, but at least some of our sample 
households will already have had access to subsidized credit in 2002. What we measure is therefore 
the additional effect of the VBSP program over the VBP and not the entire effect of the VBSP.  
 12
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1 Fixed-effect regressions of log of per capita expenditure  
The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Program variable 0.06098*** 1.32437*** 0.75677*** 0.00002** 0.00028** 0.00020*** 
 [0.02285] [0.43092] [0.22137] [0.00001] [0.00012] [0.00007] 
Age of household head 0.02168*** 0.02192*** 0.02075*** 0.02185*** 0.02213*** 0.02107*** 
 [0.00786] [0.00796] [0.00786] [0.00787] [0.00796] [0.00789] 
Age of household head squared -0.00019** -0.00019** -0.00018** -0.00019** -0.00019** -0.00018** 
 [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] 
Head are ethnic minorities 
-0.01957 -0.01715 -0.02690 -0.02079 -0.01284 -0.02173 
 [0.05890] [0.06081] [0.05893] [0.05888] [0.06041] [0.05903] 
Head professionals/technicians 0.14168* 0.13851* 0.14201* 0.14140* 0.13789* 0.14037* 
 [0.08045] [0.08065] [0.08069] [0.08068] [0.08104] [0.08104] 
Head clerks/service workers 0.07895 0.08401 0.08554 0.08062 0.08388 0.08570 
 [0.07661] [0.07638] [0.07634] [0.07674] [0.07655] [0.07645] 
Head agriculture/forestry/fishery 0.05943 0.05617 0.05768 0.06149 0.05792 0.05898 
 [0.07074] [0.07051] [0.07050] [0.07086] [0.07075] [0.07065] 
Head skilled workers/machine 
operators 0.09085 0.08955 0.09186 0.09227 0.08696 0.09227 
 [0.07738] [0.07737] [0.07718] [0.07747] [0.07756] [0.07726] 
Head unskilled workers 0.03942 0.03769 0.03731 0.04119 0.03817 0.03765 
 [0.07213] [0.07213] [0.07190] [0.07226] [0.07234] [0.07206] 
Head not working 0.06580 0.05154 0.05442 0.06834 0.05517 0.05642 
 [0.07358] [0.07364] [0.07346] [0.07373] [0.07380] [0.07361] 
Ratio of members younger than 16 
-0.19799*** -0.19297*** -0.19796*** -0.20171*** -0.19930*** -0.20210*** 
 [0.06619] [0.06750] [0.06602] [0.06592] [0.06670] [0.06571] 
Ratio of members older than 60 
-0.24444*** -0.21728** -0.22317** -0.24345*** -0.22857** -0.23167** 
 [0.08983] [0.09250] [0.09170] [0.08978] [0.09146] [0.09072] 
Household size -0.14690*** -0.14475*** -0.14696*** -0.14724*** -0.14554*** -0.14719*** 
 [0.02356] [0.02443] [0.02354] [0.02355] [0.02437] [0.02354] 
Household size squared 0.00565*** 0.00548*** 0.00565*** 0.00568*** 0.00554*** 0.00566*** 
 [0.00189] [0.00200] [0.00190] [0.00189] [0.00199] [0.00190] 
Ratio of members with lower 
secondary school 0.20831*** 0.20195*** 0.20503*** 0.20637*** 0.19539*** 0.20310*** 
 [0.04504] [0.04452] [0.04472] [0.04493] [0.04445] [0.04467] 
Ratio of members with upper 
secondary school 0.47914*** 0.48326*** 0.48135*** 0.47879*** 0.47324*** 0.47623*** 
 [0.07647] [0.07732] [0.07683] [0.07639] [0.07702] [0.07665] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree 0.52424*** 0.53701*** 0.53781*** 0.52443*** 0.52628*** 0.53201*** 
 [0.08044] [0.08178] [0.08179] [0.08033] [0.08133] [0.08145] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary school 0.70723*** 0.73279*** 0.73072*** 0.70802*** 0.72319*** 0.72652*** 
 [0.14948] [0.15089] [0.15047] [0.14942] [0.15072] [0.15027] 
Ratio of members working in 
agriculture -0.10684 -0.11269 -0.10886 -0.10642 -0.12052 -0.11674 
 [0.08288] [0.08432] [0.08380] [0.08293] [0.08381] [0.08314] 
Ratio of members working in service 0.03837 0.03088 0.03369 0.03872 0.02447 0.02686 
 [0.09125] [0.09273] [0.09217] [0.09123] [0.09200] [0.09144] 
Ratio of members working in industry 0.02498 0.01208 0.01449 0.02635 0.00836 0.00907 
 [0.08877] [0.09040] [0.08991] [0.08883] [0.08977] [0.08934] 
Being classified as poor hh. by 
commune authority -0.12006*** -0.11648*** -0.11589*** -0.12017*** -0.11717*** -0.11618*** 
 [0.02224] [0.02209] [0.02200] [0.02230] [0.02228] [0.02209] 
Log of living areas (log of m2) 0.07293*** 0.07236*** 0.07264*** 0.07264*** 0.07289*** 0.07267*** 
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The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 [0.01975] [0.01971] [0.01968] [0.01976] [0.01974] [0.01962] 
Living in semi-permanent house 
-0.00636 -0.00655 -0.00609 -0.00649 -0.00821 -0.00697 
 [0.02548] [0.02549] [0.02535] [0.02553] [0.02546] [0.02535] 
Living in temporary house 
-0.04723 -0.04837 -0.04820 -0.04763 -0.05052* -0.04943* 
 [0.03011] [0.03012] [0.02997] [0.03015] [0.03013] [0.03001] 
Have toilet (not flush type) 
-0.14103*** -0.13531*** -0.13475*** -0.14152*** -0.13633*** -0.13733*** 
 [0.02804] [0.02792] [0.02780] [0.02811] [0.02801] [0.02786] 
Have no toilet 
-0.12719*** -0.12258*** -0.12118*** -0.12716*** -0.12223*** -0.12218*** 
 [0.03259] [0.03265] [0.03253] [0.03261] [0.03267] [0.03252] 
Use other clean  water sources 
-0.02512 -0.02638 -0.02565 -0.02455 -0.02231 -0.02343 
 [0.03439] [0.03358] [0.03385] [0.03448] [0.03423] [0.03429] 
Use river or lake water 
-0.05044 -0.04896 -0.05015 -0.04978 -0.04574 -0.04858 
 [0.03568] [0.03505] [0.03518] [0.03579] [0.03559] [0.03557] 
Area of annual crop land (m2) 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Area of perennial crop land (m2) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Area of aquaculture water surface 
(m2) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Domestic remittance (thousand VND) 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Foreign remittance (thousand VND) 0.00000** 0.00000** 0.00000** 0.00000** 0.00000** 0.00000** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Pension (thousand VND) 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Insurance (thousand VND) 0.00027*** 0.00026*** 0.00027*** 0.00027*** 0.00027*** 0.00027*** 
 [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] 
Have non-farm enterprises 0.04443*** 0.04455*** 0.04448*** 0.04454*** 0.04563*** 0.04469*** 
 [0.01369] [0.01375] [0.01370] [0.01369] [0.01377] [0.01369] 
Distance to nearest agr. extension 
center (km) 0.00278*** 0.00277*** 0.00277*** 0.00276*** 0.00280*** 0.00276*** 
 [0.00094] [0.00095] [0.00094] [0.00094] [0.00095] [0.00094] 
Have national electricity network 0.07613** 0.07596** 0.08073** 0.07821** 0.08027** 0.08210** 
 [0.03351] [0.03313] [0.03309] [0.03362] [0.03327] [0.03322] 
Have car road 
-0.03908 -0.03696 -0.04014 -0.03941 -0.03692 -0.04048 
 [0.02824] [0.02818] [0.02835] [0.02835] [0.02797] [0.02851] 
Distance to nearest town (km) 0.00084 0.00091 0.00087 0.00088 0.00094 0.00090 
 [0.00125] [0.00125] [0.00125] [0.00125] [0.00125] [0.00125] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) 
-0.00166 -0.00183 -0.00165 -0.00168 -0.00178 -0.00163 
 [0.00135] [0.00138] [0.00136] [0.00135] [0.00136] [0.00135] 
Distance to nearest periodic market 
(km) -0.00215** -0.00199* -0.00206* -0.00216** -0.00202* -0.00209* 
 [0.00106] [0.00108] [0.00107] [0.00107] [0.00107] [0.00107] 
Distance to nearest primary school 
(km) 0.00788 0.00721 0.00781 0.00812 0.00735 0.00794 
 [0.00505] [0.00509] [0.00506] [0.00505] [0.00511] [0.00507] 
Distance to nearest lower secondary 
school (km) -0.00250 -0.00263 -0.00265 -0.00247 -0.00255 -0.00253 
 [0.00227] [0.00226] [0.00226] [0.00228] [0.00226] [0.00227] 
Distance to nearest upper secondary 
school (km) 0.00433*** 0.00428*** 0.00420*** 0.00430*** 0.00433*** 0.00425*** 
 [0.00111] [0.00112] [0.00112] [0.00112] [0.00112] [0.00112] 
Have commune health center 0.04671 0.04641 0.04721 0.04651 0.04598 0.04717 
 [0.07756] [0.07770] [0.07751] [0.07750] [0.07781] [0.07755] 
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The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Have health polyclinic 0.02360 0.02475 0.02570 0.02425 0.02549 0.02666 
 [0.03057] [0.03093] [0.03067] [0.03052] [0.03102] [0.03066] 
Interaction terms 
      
Program variable * Head 
professionals/technicians 
 0.16674 0.18776**  0.00003 0.00003* 
 
 [0.10724] [0.08738]  [0.00003] [0.00002] 
Program variable * Head 
clerks/service workers  -1.31855*** -1.18733***  -0.00031*** -0.00028*** 
 
 [0.25552] [0.17828]  [0.00007] [0.00005] 
Program variable * Head 
agriculture/forestry/fishery 
 0.00474   0.00000  
 
 [0.09621]   [0.00002]  
Program variable * Head skilled 
workers/machine operators  0.06722   0.00003  
 
 [0.13015]   [0.00003]  
Program variable * Head unskilled 
workers  -0.06555   -0.00002  
 
 [0.10220]   [0.00002]  
Program variable * Head not working 
 0.19654 0.22721***  0.00005 0.00007*** 
  [0.13974] [0.08131]  [0.00004] [0.00002] 
Program variable * Age of household 
head  -0.01423   0.00000  
  [0.01264]   [0.00000]  
Program variable * Age of household 
head squared 
 0.00015   0.00000  
  [0.00013]   [0.00000]  
Program variable * Head are ethnic 
minorities  -0.03191   -0.00001  
 
 [0.05913]   [0.00001]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
younger than 16 
 -0.09373   -0.00002  
 
 [0.13057]   [0.00003]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
who older than 60  -0.68024*** -0.48121***  -0.00015** -0.00012** 
 
 [0.22669] [0.18373]  [0.00007] [0.00006] 
Program variable * Household size 
 -0.02492   0.00000  
  [0.04606]   [0.00001]  
Program variable * Household size 
squared   0.00141   0.00000  
  [0.00348]   [0.00000]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with lower secondary school  0.04878   0.00002  
 
 [0.10777]   [0.00003]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with upper secondary school  -0.13384   -0.00003  
 
 [0.19530]   [0.00005]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with technical degree  -0.30102* -0.25271  -0.00007* -0.00005 
 
 [0.17934] [0.16776]  [0.00004] [0.00004] 
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with post secondary school 
 -1.45143*** -1.33132***  -0.00042*** -0.00043*** 
  [0.30240] [0.30830]  [0.00010] [0.00009] 
Program variable * Ratio of members 
working in agriculture  -0.86083*** -0.70847***  -0.00023*** -0.00019*** 
 
 [0.25988] [0.21419]  [0.00008] [0.00007] 
Program variable * Ratio of members 
working in service 
 -0.71866*** -0.60240***  -0.00020** -0.00017*** 
 
 [0.25790] [0.22643]  [0.00008] [0.00006] 
Program variable * Ratio of members 
working in industry  -0.67697*** -0.55774**  -0.00018** -0.00014** 
 
 [0.24718] [0.21674]  [0.00008] [0.00007] 
Program variable * Area of annual 
 0.00001   0.00000  
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The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
crop land (m2) 
 
 [0.00001]   [0.00000]  
Program variable * Area of perennial 
crop land (m2)  0.00000   0.00000  
 
 [0.00000]   [0.00000]  
Program variable * Area of 
aquaculture water surface (m2)  -0.00017*** -0.00016**  -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 
  [0.00006] [0.00007]  [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Constant 7.57604*** 7.56315*** 7.59437*** 7.57219*** 7.56301*** 7.59521*** 
 [0.25512] [0.25748] [0.25440] [0.25561] [0.25752] [0.25494] 
Observations 5552 5552 5552 5552 5552 5552 
Robust standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table A.2 Fixed-effect regressions of log of per capita income  
The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Program variable 0.07431** 2.45185*** 1.17379*** 0.00002* 0.00054*** 0.00030*** 
 [0.03581] [0.60832] [0.29680] [0.00001] [0.00018] [0.00007] 
Age of household head 0.01918** 0.02009** 0.01923** 0.01947** 0.02043** 0.02069** 
 [0.00829] [0.00845] [0.00837] [0.00830] [0.00839] [0.00840] 
Age of household head squared -0.00016* -0.00016* -0.00015* -0.00016** -0.00016** -0.00016** 
 [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] [0.00008] 
Head are ethnic minorities 
-0.09113 -0.08777 -0.09604 -0.09076 -0.08788 -0.08771 
 [0.07095] [0.07209] [0.07207] [0.07088] [0.07222] [0.07052] 
Head professionals/technicians 0.29754*** 0.28744*** 0.28797*** 0.29659*** 0.28984*** 0.29195*** 
 [0.10449] [0.10341] [0.10361] [0.10447] [0.10350] [0.10370] 
Head clerks/service workers 0.23965** 0.24655*** 0.24050** 0.24154** 0.24704*** 0.24587*** 
 [0.09475] [0.09508] [0.09480] [0.09469] [0.09508] [0.09506] 
Head agriculture/forestry/fishery 0.14955 0.14630 0.14540 0.15215* 0.14730 0.14461 
 [0.09087] [0.08968] [0.08929] [0.09076] [0.08957] [0.08964] 
Head skilled workers/machine 
operators 0.22770** 0.22736** 0.22109** 0.22905** 0.22615** 0.22509** 
 [0.09484] [0.09398] [0.09363] [0.09475] [0.09393] [0.09385] 
Head unskilled workers 0.15010* 0.15345* 0.14205 0.15237* 0.15335* 0.15103* 
 [0.08956] [0.08854] [0.08824] [0.08950] [0.08844] [0.08846] 
Head not working 0.08344 0.05981 0.05661 0.08642 0.06632 0.06166 
 [0.09492] [0.09461] [0.09435] [0.09477] [0.09432] [0.09441] 
Ratio of members younger than 16 
-0.27932*** -0.26438*** -0.27169*** -0.28416*** -0.27129*** -0.27802*** 
 [0.07834] [0.07889] [0.07758] [0.07812] [0.07932] [0.07778] 
Ratio of members who older than 60 
-0.21147** -0.17610* -0.16808* -0.21080** -0.18994* -0.20279** 
 [0.09781] [0.09875] [0.09909] [0.09770] [0.09817] [0.09765] 
Household size -0.16869*** -0.16545*** -0.16413*** -0.16898*** -0.16550*** -0.16746*** 
 [0.02803] [0.02869] [0.02797] [0.02800] [0.02868] [0.02790] 
Household size squared 0.00652*** 0.00629*** 0.00614*** 0.00655*** 0.00629*** 0.00644*** 
 [0.00219] [0.00229] [0.00221] [0.00218] [0.00227] [0.00219] 
Ratio of members with lower 
secondary school 0.15969*** 0.16117*** 0.16199*** 0.15795*** 0.15341*** 0.15570*** 
 [0.05226] [0.05206] [0.05123] [0.05207] [0.05213] [0.05119] 
Ratio of members with upper 
secondary school 0.22796*** 0.24054*** 0.23736*** 0.22774*** 0.23016*** 0.23219*** 
 [0.08695] [0.08615] [0.08622] [0.08679] [0.08616] [0.08564] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree 0.39347*** 0.41701*** 0.41505*** 0.39486*** 0.40117*** 0.39013*** 
 [0.09429] [0.09487] [0.09471] [0.09416] [0.09388] [0.09401] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary school 0.41815*** 0.42933*** 0.42328*** 0.41934*** 0.41721*** 0.41088*** 
 [0.15506] [0.15698] [0.15507] [0.15504] [0.15669] [0.15498] 
Ratio of members working in 
agriculture 0.04124 0.03208 0.03113 0.04175 0.01988 0.02055 
 [0.07306] [0.07310] [0.07275] [0.07308] [0.07296] [0.07289] 
Ratio of members working in service 0.32926*** 0.32749*** 0.33070*** 0.33027*** 0.31512*** 0.31419*** 
 [0.07870] [0.07885] [0.07865] [0.07870] [0.07873] [0.07866] 
Ratio of members working in industry 0.40542*** 0.39401*** 0.39387*** 0.40795*** 0.38578*** 0.38421*** 
 [0.07545] [0.07534] [0.07507] [0.07538] [0.07552] [0.07551] 
Being classified as poor hh. by 
commune authority -0.14859*** -0.14456*** -0.14374*** -0.14864*** -0.14621*** -0.14285*** 
 [0.03059] [0.02777] [0.02820] [0.03075] [0.02894] [0.02889] 
Log of living areas (log of m2) 0.08359*** 0.07983*** 0.08111*** 0.08331*** 0.08105*** 0.08113*** 
 [0.02466] [0.02438] [0.02445] [0.02469] [0.02439] [0.02444] 
Living in semi-permanent house 
-0.03087 -0.03337 -0.03202 -0.03067 -0.03510 -0.03341 
 [0.03232] [0.03221] [0.03209] [0.03232] [0.03226] [0.03220] 
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The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Living in temporary house 
-0.07861** -0.07928** -0.07769** -0.07895** -0.08055** -0.07795** 
 [0.03898] [0.03878] [0.03858] [0.03900] [0.03891] [0.03872] 
Have toilet (not flush type) 
-0.12995*** -0.12114*** -0.12225*** -0.13073*** -0.12378*** -0.12488*** 
 [0.03664] [0.03553] [0.03537] [0.03679] [0.03582] [0.03562] 
Have no toilet 
-0.12610*** -0.11733*** -0.12016*** -0.12626*** -0.11937*** -0.11877*** 
 [0.04352] [0.04297] [0.04278] [0.04359] [0.04299] [0.04277] 
Use other clean  water sources 0.00423 -0.00122 0.00027 0.00503 0.00538 0.00360 
 [0.04616] [0.04614] [0.04613] [0.04623] [0.04600] [0.04588] 
Use river or lake water 
-0.02957 -0.03020 -0.03161 -0.02863 -0.02409 -0.02706 
 [0.04935] [0.04923] [0.04909] [0.04945] [0.04903] [0.04902] 
Area of annual crop land (m2) 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Area of perennial crop land (m2) 0.00000 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00000 0.00001** 0.00001** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Area of aquaculture water surface 
(m2) 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001* 
 [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] 
Domestic remittance (thousand VND) 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Foreign remittance (thousand VND) 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Pension (thousand VND) 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 
 [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] 
Insurance (thousand VND) 0.00025*** 0.00024*** 0.00024*** 0.00024*** 0.00024*** 0.00025*** 
 [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] 
Have non-farm enterprises 0.05954*** 0.05766*** 0.05792*** 0.06016*** 0.05833*** 0.05774*** 
 [0.01789] [0.01805] [0.01794] [0.01788] [0.01806] [0.01795] 
Distance to nearest agr. extension 
center (km) 0.00475*** 0.00479*** 0.00477*** 0.00475*** 0.00480*** 0.00482*** 
 [0.00132] [0.00132] [0.00131] [0.00132] [0.00132] [0.00132] 
Have national electricity network 0.02438 0.00698 0.00808 0.02727 0.01068 0.01050 
 [0.04461] [0.03823] [0.03787] [0.04464] [0.03854] [0.03897] 
Have car road 
-0.02312 -0.01354 -0.01318 -0.02353 -0.01295 -0.01431 
 [0.04159] [0.03856] [0.03853] [0.04174] [0.03865] [0.03921] 
Distance to nearest town (km) 
-0.00012 -0.00016 -0.00017 -0.00008 -0.00011 -0.00014 
 [0.00125] [0.00123] [0.00123] [0.00125] [0.00123] [0.00124] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) 0.00049 0.00031 0.00043 0.00048 0.00032 0.00039 
 [0.00167] [0.00170] [0.00168] [0.00166] [0.00170] [0.00169] 
Distance to nearest periodic market 
(km) -0.00296* -0.00271* -0.00280* -0.00298* -0.00279* -0.00288* 
 [0.00163] [0.00163] [0.00162] [0.00163] [0.00164] [0.00162] 
Distance to nearest primary school 
(km) 0.01906*** 0.01613** 0.01666** 0.01944*** 0.01646** 0.01629** 
 [0.00728] [0.00701] [0.00698] [0.00728] [0.00703] [0.00700] 
Distance to nearest lower secondary 
school (km) -0.00654** -0.00695** -0.00696** -0.00654** -0.00696** -0.00700** 
 [0.00311] [0.00304] [0.00304] [0.00312] [0.00307] [0.00306] 
Distance to nearest upper secondary 
school (km) 0.00334* 0.00338* 0.00329* 0.00332* 0.00344** 0.00336* 
 [0.00174] [0.00174] [0.00173] [0.00174] [0.00174] [0.00173] 
Have commune health center 0.09559 0.09408 0.09605 0.09544 0.09317 0.09476 
 [0.07316] [0.07379] [0.07319] [0.07320] [0.07372] [0.07354] 
Have health polyclinic 
-0.04956 -0.05311 -0.05068 -0.04849 -0.05307 -0.05418 
 [0.04232] [0.04231] [0.04226] [0.04231] [0.04230] [0.04200] 
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The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Interaction terms 
      
Program variable * Head 
professionals/technicians  -0.29975   -0.00010*** -0.00006** 
 
 [0.18649]   [0.00003] [0.00003] 
Program variable * Head 
clerks/service workers 
 -1.79742*** -1.54274***  -0.00041*** -0.00030*** 
 
 [0.30600] [0.22335]  [0.00009] [0.00004] 
Program variable * Head 
agriculture/forestry/fishery  -0.16266   -0.00005*  
 
 [0.16035]   [0.00003]  
Program variable * Head skilled 
workers/machine operators  -0.11434   -0.00003  
 
 [0.18040]   [0.00004]  
Program variable * Head unskilled 
workers  -0.38986**   -0.00011*** -0.00006** 
 
 [0.17390]   [0.00004] [0.00003] 
Program variable * Head not working 
 0.29896 0.49309***  0.00007 0.00012** 
  [0.26219] [0.16923]  [0.00006] [0.00005] 
Program variable * Age of household 
head 
 -0.02526   0.00000 -0.00000** 
  [0.01826]   [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Program variable * Age of household 
head squared  0.00020   0.00000  
  [0.00018]   [0.00000]  
Program variable * Head are ethnic 
minorities 
 -0.05931   -0.00001  
 
 [0.07340]   [0.00002]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
younger than 16  -0.25442   -0.00005  
 
 [0.20821]   [0.00005]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
who older than 60 
 -0.76179*** -0.71357***  -0.00014  
 
 [0.27844] [0.26534]  [0.00010]  
Program variable * Household size 
 -0.02014   -0.00001  
  [0.06627]   [0.00002]  
Program variable * Household size 
squared   0.00063   0.00000  
  [0.00479]   [0.00000]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with lower secondary school  -0.11874   -0.00003  
 
 [0.14728]   [0.00004]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with upper secondary school  -0.25370   -0.00006  
 
 [0.29293]   [0.00007]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with technical degree 
 -0.42720** -0.36157*  -0.00009*  
 
 [0.21498] [0.19808]  [0.00005]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
with post secondary school  -0.34452   -0.00003  
  [0.42536]   [0.00013]  
Program variable * Ratio of members 
working in agriculture 
 -1.29154*** -1.11316***  -0.00031** -0.00022*** 
 
 [0.37573] [0.29227]  [0.00012] [0.00005] 
Program variable * Ratio of members 
working in service  -1.29148*** -1.18496***  -0.00029*** -0.00020*** 
 
 [0.32912] [0.29867]  [0.00011] [0.00004] 
Program variable * Ratio of members 
working in industry  -1.10852*** -1.02269***  -0.00025** -0.00016*** 
 
 [0.29921] [0.25222]  [0.00011] [0.00004] 
Program variable * Area of annual 
crop land (m2)  0.00001** 0.00001*  0.00000 0.00000* 
 
 [0.00001] [0.00000]  [0.00000] [0.00000] 
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The program variable is the program 
participation (dummy) 
The program variable is the loan size 
(continuous) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Program variable * Area of perennial 
crop land (m2) 
 -0.00002*** -0.00002***  -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 
 
 [0.00000] [0.00000]  [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Program variable * Area of 
aquaculture water surface (m2)  -0.00014   0.00000  
  [0.00014]   [0.00000]  
Constant 7.57632*** 7.55564*** 7.57954*** 7.56750*** 7.55446*** 7.55781*** 
 [0.28488] [0.28782] [0.28615] [0.28573] [0.28724] [0.28787] 
Observations 5552 5552 5552 5552 5552 5552 
Robust standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
 
